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The differences in financial development across Indian 
states, while seeming substantial, have a minor effect on 
firm lifecycle and growth. These results hold controlling for 
differences in labor regulations across states, capital inten-
sity, and for firms born before and after the major reforms. 
There is no evidence that firms in financially dependent 
industries have different lifecycle profiles or grow faster in 
financially developed states than underdeveloped states. 
Overall, firms in the formal manufacturing sector grow as 
they age whereas in the informal sector, firms have a declin-
ing lifecycle, but in both cases little evidence is found that 
financial institutions matter for firm lifecycle. The find-
ings of this paper suggest that size and depth differences 
in financial development across Indian states are likely 
dwarfed by overall inefficiencies that characterize state-
dominated financial systems, with important implications 
for the reforms of the Indian financial system going forward.
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I Introduction 
 
An influential body of research in finance has established the importance of life-cycle 
explanations for many fundamental corporate finance policies in the US.1 Much less is known 
about lifecycle issues in developing countries. We do know that in the U.S., new businesses start 
small and, if they survive, grow fast as they age. 2 It is an open question as to whether firms in 
developing countries face a similar size-age profile as in the US given that they face entirely 
different business environments and operating conditions.  
Furthermore, the role of institutions in determining how firm size and growth evolve over 
the lifecycle in developing countries is still largely a black-box. For instance, a large literature 
has shown the importance of financial development for firm growth (see Levine (2005) for a 
review).  While most studies have focused on cross-country data (e.g. King and Levine, 1993; 
Levine and Zervos, 1998), or industry-level analyses (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998), or firm-
level studies (e.g. Demirguc-kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), there have been several country case 
studies showing that financial development across states within a country matter. Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1996) and Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2007) show that differences in state-level bank 
regulation in the United States affects financial development which has an impact on economic 
growth; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) examine differences in financial development 
across regions in Italy, particularly on small firms and entrepreneurship and find that local 
financial development matters for economic success. Other studies such as Bertrand, Schoar, and 
Thesmar (2007) examine the impact of deregulation in France on the functioning of credit 
1Research has shown the importance of life-cycle explanations for dividends (Fama and French (2001), Grullon et 
al. (2002), and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006), Denis and Osobov (2008)), financing (Berger and Udell, 
1998), stock valuations (Pastor and Veronesi (2003)) and acquisitions (Maksimovic and Philips (2008), Arikan and 
Stulz (2013)). 
2 See, for example, Evans, 1987; Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1989; Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996; 
Caves, 1998; Hsieh and Klenow, 2012.  
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markets and their impact of the structure and dynamics of product markets. Still unanswered 
though is the impact of financial institutions on firm lifecycle in developing countries. 
In this paper, we examine whether domestic financial development matters for explaining 
firm3 lifecycles in a developing country like India. Specifically, we examine the relationship 
between plant size, age, and growth using detailed manufacturing census data from India and 
ask: how does local financial development influence the size-age relationship?  Are there 
differences in the size-age relationship across different industry characteristics and between the 
formal and informal manufacturing sector and does this vary with the extent of local financial 
development? Does the role of local financial development on firm lifecycle vary with major 
regulation changes in India such as financial liberalization, changes in labor regulation, and 
industry de-licensing?   
India offers an ideal laboratory for testing the role of institutions on firm lifecycle given 
the large persistent differences in institutions, business environment, and income across different 
regions in India (Ahluwalia, 2002). In an interesting comparison, the Economist magazine 
matches India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, to Brazil in terms of population, Qatar in 
terms of size of the economy, and Kenya in terms of its GDP/capita. Maharashtra, on the other 
hand is one of India’s richest states and is equivalent to Mexico in terms of population, 
Singapore in terms of GDP, and Sri Lanka in terms of GDP/capita.4  Importantly, there is 
substantial and well researched heterogeneity in financial and labor institutions across these 
states. Overall however, India ranks quite low on different indicators of financial development. 
For instance, the Global Findex database ranks India as 77 of 147 countries in terms of 
3 For brevity we use the terms firm and establishment interchangeably since the vast majority (over 72%) of firms in 
India are single establishment firms. We obtain similar results in other contexts when we restrict our analysis to 
firms with single establishments. 
4 All the comparisons are based on 2009 values. See “Comparing Indian states and territories with countries,” The 
Economist Magazine, June 21, 2011. 
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percentage of adults with an account at a formal financial institution. At the same time, 
comprehensive and centrally collected Census data at the firm-level is available to researchers, 
thereby sidestepping many of the concerns arising from data comparability in cross-country 
studies. India is also an interesting case study because some recent studies (e.g. Hsieh and 
Klenow, 2012) suggest that India has a flat life-cycle where fo40-year-old plants are no larger 
than young plants. Our India sample comprises of repeated cross-section census data for the 
formal manufacturing sector at roughly five year intervals - 1983/84; 1989/90; 1994/95; 2000/01; 
and 2004/055 and census data on the informal sector for 1994/1995. 
We have the following main findings: Despite considerable differences in financial depth 
across Indian states we find the role of financial development to be marginal in explaining 
lifecycles in the broad population of firms and in most of the sub-samples we analyze. These 
results are robust to a number of checks including looking at just the firms in the right tail of the 
size distributions, across states with flexible versus rigid labor market regulation, and using 
alternate indicators of financial development. We also find no differential impact of financial 
development on lifecycle when we look at firms born after India’s financial liberalization in 
1991 or looking at periods after industry de-licensing. We also find only marginal differences in 
the proportion of manufacturing employment in old and new firms across different levels of 
financial development.   
Second, we find the extent of financial dependence of industries does not predict the life 
cycles of firms across states in India. We use the identification strategy introduced by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) for classifying industries into financially dependent and financially independent 
depending on the extent to which firms can support their capital expenditures using cash flow 
5 Repeated cross-sections helps us look at life-cycle patterns over a longer period of time in addition to providing us 
more observations at each point in the life-cycle. It also allows us to examine if our results are consistent over 
different periods of institutional change in India such as financial liberalization and industry de-licensing.  
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from operations, based on the experiences of US firms in the same industries. We find that firms 
in financially dependent industries are larger at all stages of their life-cycle. Thus, there is no 
evidence that financial dependence affects growth rates of established Indian firms relative to 
firms in industries that are not financially dependent. 6 Furthermore we do not see that firms in 
financially dependent industries are larger or face different lifecycle effects in financially 
developed states than under-developed states. Using a similar difference-in-difference set-up we 
also find that firms in large-firm dominated industries are larger at each stage of the life-cycle, 
both in the case of capital intensive and labor intensive industries.7  
Our findings contrast with the literature that finds significant effect of within-country 
institutional differences on firm performance. For example, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and 
Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2007) show that differences in state-level bank regulation in the 
United States affects financial development. Similarly, Guiso et al. (2004) examine differences 
in financial development across regions in Italy, particularly on small firms and entrepreneurship 
and find a significant effect.  The explanation for the differences in conclusions is most likely 
that the state-owned and controlled financial sector in India is not significantly contributing to 
firm growth. In such a system, the regional differences in financial development as measured by 
the financial depth of the banking system may be masked by other potentially more important 
institutional (e.g. infrastructure constraints) and firm-specific factors (e.g. organizational form). 
The finance literature also shows that in a large cross-section of countries, higher government 
ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower 
6 Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that financially dependent industries grow less fast than financially independent 
industries using a sample of developed and developing countries. 
7 Following Beck et al. (2008), we classify industries into small firm dominated and large firm dominated categories 
using the US industry composition as an instrument. Beck et al. measure an industry’s “technological” composition 
of small firms relative to large firms as the share of employment in firms with less than 20 employees in the United 
States (a country with a relatively frictionless financial system) in 1997.  To classify industries into labor vs. capital 
intensive we follow Hasan and Jandoc (2012) 
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income per capita growth and productivity (La Porta et al, 2002; Barth et al. 2001), as well as 
poorer financial access by small firms (e.g. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005). Our 
findings are also consistent with those of Boyreu-Debray (2003) and Boyreau-Debray and Wei 
(2005) who show that the depth of the financial sector does not promote growth of provinces in 
China, another country where the banking system is largely state owned and controlled.  Hence, 
our findings on India provide additional evidence that state-ownership in banking hampers the 
impact of finance on growth.  
The finding that differences in financial depth in a state-owned financial system do not 
affect the life-cycles of firms does not imply that there are no qualitative differences in financial 
access within those systems and that they do not benefit individual firms. For example, Cole 
(2009)’s Indian study uses a regression discontinuity design and finds that government 
ownership of banks adversely affects the development of small enterprises in villages in which 
these banks have branches. In another study of Chinese banks and enterprises, Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Makimovic (2010) find that controlling for local financial development, 
firms that receive bank financing outperform firms that do not. However, Ayyagari et. al. do not 
address the question of whether differences in financial depth at the province level materially 
affect the aggregate province level growth or the life-cycles of the firms comprising the whole of 
the manufacturing sector. 
Overall, our analyses of firm lifecycle in India shows that the average 40 year old firm in 
the formal sector in India is 2 to 4 times the size of firms less than five years of age. Our results 
hold true when we take sampling weights into account and look at the entire population of firms. 
Thus, while firms in India may not be growing at the same rate as in developed countries such as 
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the US where the size-age ratio is eight times (Hsieh and Klenow, 2012), there is clear evidence 
that older firms in the formal manufacturing sector are larger than younger firms.   
We do find stark differences in firm lifecycle in the formal and informal sectors: Older 
firms in the unorganized manufacturing sector in India employ fewer people than firms younger 
than 5 years old. This is consistent with recent findings in La Porta and Shleifer (2008) who 
show that informal firms look very different from formal firms in terms of size, productivity, and 
education level of managers and find little evidence that growth occurs by informal firms 
eventually becoming large formal firms. 
Our results also contribute to the large literature on firm size and age (Dunne, Roberts, 
and Samuelson, 1989; Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh,1996; Cabral and Matta, 2003, Foster, 
Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2012). Given the idiosyncratic distortions in the business 
environment, it is not clear what type of size-age gap to expect in developing countries. A recent 
paper by Hsieh and Klenow (2012) suggests that in India and Mexico, in contrast to the case of 
the U.S., the lifecycle of manufacturing plants is relatively flat - that in fact on average the 
surviving manufacturing plants in India shrink in size between ages of 5 and 35. The dual 
economy view in development economics (originally associated with Harris and Todaro, 1970) 
predicts that informal firms should look very different from formal firms in terms of size, 
productivity, wages paid, and the industries/markets they operate in. Recent studies such as La 
Porta and Shleifer (2008) also show that while informal firms account for a large portion of 
economic activity in developing countries, growth and development comes from the creation of 
highly productive formal firms. Strikingly, Hsieh and Klenow find that plants in both the formal 
and the informal sector share the same trajectories.  Our results using data for the same year 
1994/95 as in their paper stand in sharp contrast with their findings on the formal sector. Given 
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the heterogeneity in firm formation we study the formal sector and informal sectors separately in 
this paper and do find differing life-cycle patterns. Our findings are also consistent with 
Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2013) who find the upward sloping size-age profile 
to be pervasive across a vast majority of developing countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe the data. In 
section III we discuss in detail the relationship between firm size and age in India. In this section 
we also reconcile our findings on the financial sector in India with the broader finance and 
growth literature. Section IV concludes. 
 
II Data 
We use data on formal manufacturing plants in India from the Annual Survey of 
Industries (ASI), which is conducted by the Indian Ministry of Statistics and Program 
Implementation. The ASI sampling frame consists of all registered factories employing 10 or 
more workers using power or 20 or more workers without using power. The sampling frame 
consists of the “Census” sector which are surveyed every year and the “Sample” sector where 
plants are sampled randomly and unit multipliers are provided to take into account sampling 
probabilities. The definitions of the Census and Sample sectors have changed over the years as 
described in the table in Appendix A.8 In robustness checks, we find all our results to hold when 
we just analyze the Census sample. We use data from five years: 1983/84; 1989/90; 1994/95; 
2000/01, and 2004/05.  
8 The ASI also contains some establishments outside of manufacturing. Thus while the primary unit of enumeration 
in the survey is a factory in the case of manufacturing industries, it could also be a workshop (for repair services), an 
undertaking or a licensee (electricity, gas & water supply undertakings) or an establishment (bidi & cigar industries). 
According to the Ministry of Statistics, “the owner of two or more establishments located in the same State and 
pertaining to the same industry group and belonging to census scheme is, however, permitted to furnish a single 
consolidated return. Such consolidated returns are common  feature mostly in the case of bidi and cigar 
establishments, electricity and certain public sector undertakings” 
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The specific ASI variables we use are described below: Firm Age is defined as the year 
of the census - year of initial production reported by the firms. We define 9 age bins as follows : 
<5, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40+. Firm Size is the total number of 
workers which includes workers employed directly, workers employed through contractors, 
supervisory and managerial staff, other employees, working proprietors, unpaid family workers, 
and unpaid working members if cooperative factory. As a measure of growth rates, we construct 
Firm Size Ratio which is the ratio of each firm’s firm size scaled by the average firm size of all 
firms in its birth cohort. Thus, we scale the employment of the each firm in youngest age bin 
(<5) in 2004 by the average size of that age bin in 2004, of the firms in the age bin (5-9) in 2004 
by the average size in the youngest age bin (<5) in 1999, of the firms in the age bin (10-14) in 
2004 by the average size in the youngest age bin (<5) in 1994, of the firms in the age bin (15-19) 
in 2004 by the average size in the youngest age bin (<5) in 1989, of the firms in the age bin (20-
24) in 2004 by the average size in the youngest age bin (<5) in 1983, and so on. Since our sample 
period extends from 1983/84 to 2004/05 we are able to construct this ratio for only the following 
age bins - <5, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, and 20-24. 
To deal with outliers, we winsorize the bottom and top 1% of all plant-level variables and 
drop firms that stated initial year of production to be before 1800 and clear data errors where the 
year of initial production is given to be after the year of the survey.  The data also provides 
National Industry Classification (NIC) codes that map onto different revisions of the 
International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) codes.9 Using this we construct three digit 
9 The census years 1983/84 uses NIC-70 which maps onto ISIC-Revision 2 at the 3-digit level. The 1989/90 and 
1994/95 censuses use NIC-87 which maps onto ISIC-Revision 3 at the 3-digit level. The 1999/00 and 2000/01 
censuses use NIC-98 which maps onto ISIC-Revision 3 at the 3-digit level. The 2004/05 census uses NIC-04 which 
maps onto ISIC-Revision 3.1 at the 3-digit level. 
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NIC industry dummies that are consistent across all census-years and restrict the data to only the 
manufacturing sector.10  
To explore industry heterogeneity, we use three different classifications of industries. 
First, we follow the procedure in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and estimate an industry’s 
dependence on external financing using data on US corporations (RZ index). The RZ index is 
based on the assumption that since U.S. financial markets are developed, sophisticated, have 
fewer market imperfections and relatively open they should allow US firms to achieve their 
desired financial structure. Thus assuming that there are technological reasons why some 
industries depend more on eternal finance than others, the RZ index offers an exogenous way to 
identify the extent of external dependence of an industry anywhere in the world. The 
methodology does not require that the US markets are perfect but rather that market 
imperfections in the US do not distort the ranking of industries in terms of the technological 
dependence on external financing. 
We reconstruct the RZ index for the period 1980-2012 by computing external 
dependence as (Capital Expenditures-Operating Cash Flow)/Capital Expenditures for each 
domestic US firm in Compustat. The median value across firms in each industry is a measure of 
that industry’s dependence on external finance. This index of external dependence is constructed 
at the SIC 2/3 digit level which is then manually matched to 3-digit ISIC codes that map onto the 
Indian NIC classification. Appendix C provides the concordance used in the paper. We construct 
EFD, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if industry’s dependence on external finance is ≥ 
median value of dependence on external finance across industries and 0 if it was < the median 
across industries.   
10 We drop recycling from the manufacturing sector since it is not included under manufacturing in the ISIC 
classification. 
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Second, we create Small Firm Industry which is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 if the industry’s share of employment in firms with less than 20 employees is ≥ median value 
of the Index of small firm domination from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2008) 
and takes the value 0 if it is < the median index value. Beck et. al. (2008) use the methodology in 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) described above to argue that each industry has a technological firm 
size that depends on that industry’s particular production process and that these technological 
differences should persist across countries. They construct each industry’s share of employment 
in firms with less than 20 employees in the US using data from the 1997 US Census. 11  
Finally, we follow Hasan and Jandoc (2012) in constructing Labor Intensive Industries 
which is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for labor intensive industries and 0 for capital 
intensive industries.12   
We use data on informal firms from the Unorganized Manufacturing sector for 1994/95 
that is collected by the National Sample Survey (NSS) Office of the Ministry of Statistics.  The 
survey uses a stratified two-stage sampling design where the first-stage units are the villages in 
the rural areas and urban blocks in the urban areas and the second-stage units are the enterprises. 
The allocation of sample first stage units between rural and urban areas is in proportion to 
population as per 1991 census with double weightage to the urban sector. As seen in Appendix 
B, the informal sector in India is very large and dwarfs the formal sector in terms of the number 
of firms. Firm Size and Age variables are calculated similar to the formal manufacturing census 
described above. 
11 Beck et. al. present alternate indices including using 100 employees as the cut-off and using 1992 census to 
construct the index. Our results are robust to these alternate classifications. 
12 Hasan and Jandoc (2012) classify the following industries in India to be capital intensive industries: Machinery, 
Electrical Machinery, Transport, Metals and Alloys, Rubber/Plastic/Petroleum/Coal and Paper/Paper Products. The 
labor-intensive industries are: Beverages and Tobacco, Textile Products, Wood/Wood Products, Leather/Leather 
Products and Non-Metallic Products. The remaining industries are not as clearly distinguishable and include: Food 
Products, Textiles, Basic Chemicals, Metal Products and Other Manufacturing 
11 
 
                                                 
 A.1. Finance and Labor Market Institutions in India 
To take into account institutional differences that may affect firm life-cycle, we focus on 
the level of financial development and the stringency of labor regulations across different states 
of India. We first describe India’s banking sector and the measures we construct followed by the 
stringency of labor regulation in India and the associated measures. 
India has a rich and mature banking history with the first banks being established by the 
British East India Company towards the end of the 18th century. India’s largest bank today, the 
State Bank of India originated in 1806 as the Bank of Calcutta. Following India’s independence, 
in 1949, the Banking Regulation Act vested the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), India’s Central 
Bank, with extensive powers for supervision of banking in India.  In two waves of 
nationalization in 1969 and 1980, the Indian government nationalized the major private banks 
running them as profit-making public sector undertakings that were allowed to compete and 
operate as commercial banks.13 This increased the public sector banks’ share of deposits to 92% 
(Hanson, 2001). The Government also experimented with a social banking program during this 
period to improve access to banking services for the poor leading to a huge expansion in the 
number of bank branches (Burgess and Pande, 2005).  
In response to a fiscal and balance of payments crisis in 1991, India went through a large-
scale financial liberalization. Following the recommendations of the Narasimhan Committee 
Report that suggested reforms in the Indian banking sector, the Government allowed for the 
entry of new private sector banks (including foreign banks) in 1993. Despite the massive growth 
13 In 1969, 14 banks with deposits over Rs 50 crores were nationalized. In 1980, 6 private sector banks were 
nationalized. A few of the private sector banks were not nationalized because of their small size and regional focus. 
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of private sector banks, India’s banking system is still largely state dominated. As of 2012, 
India’s state owned banks have 73% of market share of assets and 83% of branches.14  
Even within this government dominated banking sector, there is a large variation across 
India’s states in level of financial development. Bajpai and Sachs (1999) note that there has been 
a wide variation in the adoption of economic reforms with states like Maharashtra being very 
reform oriented while others, especially the poorest BIMARU15 states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh) being laggards. Aghion et al. (2005) also note the reforms in the 
1990s to be associated with increasing cross-state inequality in industrial performance.  
Insert Table 1 here 
Our measure of financial development is the ratio of total Commercial Bank Credit 
outstanding to the Net State Domestic Product (SDP) in each census year and gauges the depth 
of financial development. The data is sourced from Burgess and Pande (2005) with updates from 
the Reserve Bank of India (http://dbie.rbi.org.in). According to statistics by the Reserve Bank of 
India, in March 2006, there were about 217 commercial banks in operation,  with 161 of  them 
state owned (includes nationalized banks and regional rural banks), 27 private sector banks and 
the rest 29 foreign banks.16 Despite the entry of private banks, state controlled banks still account 
for three-quarters of all loans in India. India’s largest commercial bank, the State Bank of India, 
is over two hundred years old and is government owned. Banerjee, Cole, and Duflo (2004) state 
that 83% of banking business in India is through government owned banks and even the private 
banks are subject to extensive regulations on who they can lend to.  
14 Speech by Dr Duvvuri Subbarao, Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, at the FICCI–IBA (Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce & Industry – Indian Banks’ Association) Annual Banking Conference, Mumbai, 13 August 
2013. http://www.bis.org/review/r130813b.pdf?frames=0. 
15 BIMARU resembles the Hindi word “Bimar” meaning sick. 
16 http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/78903.pdf 
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We only have data on financial development across 15 Indian states but these are the 
major states of India with the highest SDP, accounting for 95% of India’s population and 90% of 
India’s GDP in 2004/05. Table 1 shows a wide variation in Credit/SDP across the states ranging 
from 0.073 in 1983 in Assam, one of India’s poorest states to 0.477 in Maharashtra, one of the 
richest Indian states with a median value of 0.19 (Gujarat) in 1983. These differences persist 
over our sample period and the values in 2004/05, the last year in our sample, are 0.171 in 
Assam and 1.148 in Maharashtra.  Based on Credit/SDP, we construct a dummy variable, FD, 
which takes the value 1 for a particular state in a particular year if that state is at the median or 
above the median value of financial development in that year across states and 0 for states that 
are below the median value of financial development. Across the years, we find six states to 
always be classified as financially developed – Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, 
Tamil Nadu, and Maharashtra. Only two of the states, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, switch 
from being classified as being financially under-developed to developed in 2004/05 while 
Gujarat and West Bengal are classified as under-developed in the last year. 
India’s labor regulations have been known to be among the most stringent in the world 
and responsible for the stagnant share of manufacturing outputs in India’s GDP (Dougherty, 
2009). Under the Indian Constitution, both central and state governments have joint jurisdiction 
over labor market regulation. One of the most important set of labor regulations governing 
Indian industry is the centrally legislated Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 which lays out the 
arbitration and adjudication procedures in industrial disputes, and which has been extensively 
amended by state governments.  A large literature has evolved quantifying labor market 
regulations across different states of India, the most well-known being Besley and Burgess 
(2004), that code the legislative state-level amendments to IDA to classify states as pro-worker 
14 
 
(score of +1) or pro-employer (-1) or neutral (0) over the period 1958 to 1992. Given the limited 
time-series variation within states, Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy (2007) build on the Besley-
Burgess dataset to cumulate the coded scores in net years into a time-invariant index of the 
general direction in labor regulations, classifying states with anti-employee amendments as those 
with flexible labor markets and the others as inflexible labor markets. They argue that the scores 
on cumulative amendments between 1980 and 1997 do not vary much over time within states, 
with eight of the states showing no amendment activity since 1980. Dougherty (2009) further 
reports that only 8 amendments (in 3 states) have been recorded since 1990, and only one 
amendment passed in 2004 appears to be of material importance to labor market outcomes. 
Gupta et al. (2008) build a composite index based on a simple majority rule across the indicators 
proposed in Besley and Burgess (2004), Bhattacharjea (2006), and Dougherty (2009), and 
classify five states to have flexible labor regulations, (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Rajasthan, 
Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh), three states to have inflexible labor market regulations 
(Maharashtra, Orissa, and West Bengal and the remaining seven to be neutral (Assam, Bihar, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, and Punjab). 17  
Following Gupta et al. (2008)’s composite classification, we create a Flexible State 
dummy that takes the value 1 for states with flexible labor regulation and 0 for states with rigid 
or neutral labor regulations as shown in panel B of Table 1. We make one change to the Gupta et 
al. classification of using the pre-2000 state boundaries in classifying states. So our flexible 
states classification includes Uttaranchal (which split from Uttar Pradesh in 2000) and inflexible 
states classification includes Jharkhand and Chattisgarh that were formerly part of Bihar and 
Madhya Pradesh respectively).  
17 The labor market regulation index is not available for the following states and union territories: Jammu & 
Kashmir, Chandigarh, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya, Daman & Diu, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Pondicherry, 
Lakshadweep, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands. 
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Insert Table 2 here 
Table 2 presents summary statistics and correlations for our main variables from the 
formal manufacturing Census. Table 2 shows that after winsorizing, Firm Size ranges from 1 to 
1616 employees with a mean of 121 employees. The mean Firm Size Ratio is 1.38 suggesting 
that the average firm in our sample is 1.38 times the size of its birth cohort. 62% of  the firm-year 
observations are classified as small firm industries, 23% are classified as labor intensive and 
42% are classified as being in industries that are highly dependent on external finance. 69% of 
the firms are in states with flexible labor regulations and 73% are in financially developed states. 
Panel B presents the correlation matrix between these variables. The sample correlations 
with age dummies show that older firms are larger and growing faster. When we look at the 
industry classifications we find that none of the correlations between the industry categories are 
larger than 0.19 suggesting that the three measures – Small Firm Industry, Labor Intensive, and 
EFD – are capturing three different aspects of industry technology. Overall we find that small 
firm industries are positively correlated with labor intensive industry and negatively correlated 
with external finance dependence. The correlations with Firm Size and Firm Size Ratio show 
that firms are larger and grow faster in large firm dominated industries, in capital intensive 
industries and in industries that are not highly dependent on external finance. The raw 
correlations also show that firms in financially developed states are larger and grow faster. On 
the other hand, while firms in states with flexible labor regulations are smaller, they are growing 
faster. 
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III Firm Size and Age in India 
A. Lifecycle in the Formal Manufacturing Sector  
To examine the relationship between firm size and age, we pool repeated cross-section 
data from the Indian census. We begin with some descriptive statistics of our data. For each 
census year separately, we first compute the mean employment in each age bin reported by that 
census. We then compute an index for each year of data where the index takes the value 1 for 
firms less than five years old. For all other age bins, the index is the ratio of the mean 
employment in that age bin to the mean employment for firms under five years of age reported in 
the same census. Figure 1 plots the mean index for each age bin using data for five repeated 
cross-sections – 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, and 2004/05. The figure shows that the 
average 40+ year old plant is 3 to 5 times the size of the plants under five years of age. The firms 
in the 40+ age bin are typically large firms (mean size is 291 employees compared to sample 
mean of 121 employees). Many of these firms (62%) were born during the colonial era before 
India achieved independence from Britain in 1947, so the early growth opportunities of the latter 
subsample will have occurred in a distinct business and regulatory environment. Khanna and 
Palepu (2005) detail how British merchants set up large trading houses in India which were 
transferred to Indian owners in the 1950s. 
Figure 2 presents data using weighted employment and shows that for the average 40+ 
year old plant, the ratio varies from 4.8 times in 1983 to 2.2 in 1994. We also see that in recent 
years, the average 30 year old plant is not that much larger than plants younger than five years 
old but after that, older plants are larger than the young plants.  
To mitigate concerns about sampling issues we present data only using the census sector 
in Figure 3 and find that even the 20 year old plant in most years is twice as large as plants 
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younger than five years of age. Figure 3 also shows that over time the size-age gap for the 40+ 
year old plant has shrunk starting from 4.91 in 1983/84 to 2.62 in 2004/05. In unreported figures 
we find similar results when we use a weighted average across all industries in each age bin with 
the weights being the value added shares of each industry.  
The graphs show a much faster growth rate for Indian plants than found by Hsieh and 
Klenow (2012) who document a flat plant lifecycle in Indian manufacturing, including in just the 
formal sector, using only data form the 1994/95 Census. The differences are particularly stark 
later in the lifecycle where we find older plants to be much larger while they find older plants to 
be declining in size.  
Insert Table 3 here 
 In Table 3, we use pooled OLS regressions to explore the age effects in detail. In col. 1, 
we regress Firm Size on age dummies and find all the age coefficients to be positive and 
significant suggesting that older firms are larger than younger firms. For ease of comparison with 
youngest firms, we add the constant (which presents the average mean size for firms younger 
than 5 years old) to each of the age coefficients and divide the sum by the constant. These ratios 
are reported in bold in square brackets below the coefficient and standard errors. Thus we see 
that the average 40+ year old firm is 3.775 times the size of the average firm that is younger than 
five years old.  In col. 2, we repeat the analysis in Col. 1 using 3-digit NIC industry dummies and 
state dummies. While we are not allowing for time varying changes across states and industries, 
the dummies help us control for any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across states and 
industries. Once again we find that all the age coefficients are positive and significant. Figure 4 
plots the coefficients for the age dummies and the 95% confidence bands and shows that even 
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after controlling for period effects, location, and industry, older firms are larger than firms 
younger than five years old (reference sample). 
 In columns 1 and 2, we are comparing the mean size of firms that are 40+ years old in the 
pooled sample with the mean size of firms that are younger than 5 years old. However, young 
firms could be varying in size across years due to different macroeconomic factors, entry 
regulations, capital market openness, etc. Figure 5 plots the mean employment and the 
confidence intervals for firms younger than five years old in each census year and shows that the 
average size of the youngest firms almost doubles between 1983 and 199518 and then reduces.   
In order to obtain true lifecycle effects and to see if firms indeed grow as they age over 
their lifecycle, we would want to compare the size of older firms at any given point in time with 
their size when they were born. In the absence of panel data we are unable to look at the 
employment of the exact firm when it was born and hence rely on the mean employment in its 
birth cohort. Thus we construct Firm Size Ratio, which is the size of firms in a particular age bin 
scaled by the mean size of the firms in their birth cohort. Since our sample period extends from 
1983 to 2005, the oldest firms in our sample for which we can obtain this comparison are firms 
that are 20-24 years old in 2005 with their birth cohort being firms that were  <5 years old in 
1983. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 present regressions with the Firm Size Ratio. Col. 3 shows 
that firms that are 20-24 years old are 1.419 times the size of average firms in their birth cohort. 
The constant in col. 3 is again the reference category of firms younger than five years old and 
since we are scaling each firms employment by the mean employment of their birth cohort (firms 
younger than 5 years old when the firms was born) and using OLS we would expect it to be 1 as 
it is. Col. 4 shows that after controlling for industry, location, and year dummies, firms that are 
18 Hsieh and Klenow (2012) use data from 1995 for their main analysis thus scaling the employment of all firms 
with that of the youngest firms in 1995, which is also the year when the youngest firms were the largest in our 
sample period. 
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20-24 years old are 1.86 times the size when they were born.  Col. 4 also shows that there must 
be heterogeneity across industries (e.g. labor vs. capital intensive), states (e.g. regulation), and 
firm types (e.g. organization structure) in the size of the firms younger than 5 years old since the 
constant is no longer 1. 
Overall Table 3 shows that manufacturing plants in India grow as they age. 
 
B. Heterogeneity across Industries in Firm lifecycle 
 In this section we explore if there are technological differences across industries that 
must be taken into account when considering lifecycle effects. In the regression tables in this 
section and the following section, we first show the regression results and then show the 
corresponding margin plots of the interaction coefficients for ease of interpretation. While these 
margin plots give an idea of the initial starting points of plants in different industries and give an 
idea of relative size across different age groups, we also present results taking the ratio of the 
predicted margin of each age group with that of the youngest firms to give an estimate of growth 
rates. 
In column 1 of Table 4 we interact Age Dummies with Small Firm Industry dummy. The 
main age effects are positive and significant suggesting that the average older firm is larger and 
the main effect of Small Firm Industry is negative and significant suggesting that average firm 
size in small firm dominated industries is smaller than that in large firm dominated industries. 
The interaction coefficients are all negative and significant. To better interpret the interaction 
effects, we plot the predictive margins of the interaction coefficients in col. 1 along with the 95% 
confidence intervals in Figure 6. The first panel in Figure 6 shows that the average size of firms 
in large firm dominated industries is higher than that in small firm dominated industries across 
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all age groups. Large firm dominated industries are also growing faster than small firm 
dominated industries. In Panel B of Table 4 we present the ratio of the predictive margins of each 
age bin to that of the reference group to obtain an estimate of growth rates. Cols 1 and 2 of Panel 
B show that the average 40+ year old firm is 5.11 times the size of firms that are younger than 
five years old in large firm dominated industries while that ratio is only 2.74 in small firm 
dominated industries.  
Insert Table 4 here 
In col. 2 of panel A we look at the interaction of labor intensive industry and age. The age 
effects are again positive and significant while the labor intensive industry dummy is positive 
and significant suggesting that on average employment levels are higher in labor intensive 
industries. The second panel in Figure 6 plots the margin plots of the interaction coefficients and 
shows that while firms in capital intensive industries start out smaller than those in labor 
intensive industries they grow faster and are larger than firms in labor intensive industries as they 
age. Cols. 3 and 4 of Panel B show that the average 40+ year old firm is 4.08 times the size of 
firms that are younger than five years old in capital intensive industries while that ratio is only 
2.38 in labor intensive industries. 
The correlation coefficient of the Small Firm Industry dummy and Labor Intensity 
Dummy is only 6.3% (see panel B of Table 2). However to investigate if the difference in age 
effects in Small firm versus Large firm dominated industries varies by labor intensity in col. 3 of 
panel A of Table 4, we explore the triple interaction of age dummies with Small Firm Industry 
dummy and Labor Intensity dummy. The interaction of labor intensity and small firm dominated 
industry is positive and significant. Figure 7 plots the predictive margins of the triple interaction 
coefficients and shows that the average size is the biggest in Capital Intensive and Large Firm 
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dominated industries while in the Small Firm dominated Labor Intensive industries growth over 
the firm’s life-cycle is the lowest. The figure also shows that older firms in Capital Intensive and 
Large Firm Dominated industries are particularly large while the differences between the other 
industry classifications are not as stark. 
In cols. 5-8 of panel B, we take the ratio of the predictive margins in each age group in 
each industry category with the predictive margin of the youngest firms in that industry category. 
We find that the average 40+ year old firm is 5.69 times larger than firms younger than 5 years 
old in large firm dominated and capital intensive industries where as that ratio is 2.71, 3.02, and 
2.12 in large firm and labor intensive industries, small firm dominated and capital intensive 
industries, and small firm dominated and labor intensive industries respectively.  
To explore the role of external financing in the firm lifecycle and firm growth we divide 
the sample into industries that are dependent on external finance and those that are not dependent 
on external finance using the index of external finance dependence (EFD). In col.4 of Table 4 we 
interact the age dummies with EFD. The age dummy coefficients are all positive and significant 
suggesting that on average older firms are larger. The EFD dummy is positive but not significant 
whereas the interaction of EFD with age dummies is positive and significant. To better interpret 
the interaction terms we plot the predictive margins along with the 95% confidence intervals in 
Figure 8. The figure shows that while firms in industries that are dependent on external finance 
start out the same size as firms in industries that are not highly dependent on external finance, 
they grow faster and are larger as they age. Cols. 9 and 10 of Panel B show that the average 40+ 
year old firms in industries that are not highly dependent on external finance is 2.93 times the 
size of firms younger than five years old in those industries whereas that number is 4.89 times in 
industries that are highly dependent on external finance.  
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Overall, Table 4 and figures 6-8 show that the initial starting point of firms and their 
growth rates are different depending on their industries’ technological size, production 
technology, and dependence on external finance.  Firms grow more over their life-cycles in 
industries predicted to be large-firm-dominated based on US data and in capital-intensive 
industries and in industries more dependent on external finance.   
 
C. Financial Development and Firm Life-cycle 
In this section, we examine variations in firm lifecycle across different levels of financial 
development of the states they are located in and across different industry characteristics. In 
these regressions, we don’t include state fixed effects but instead control for net State Domestic 
Product (SDP)/capita (in logs).  In col.1 of Table 5, we investigate the role of financial 
development on firm life-cycle by interacting age dummies with FD, a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 for financially developed states and 0 for financially under-developed states. 
The financial development dummy is by itself positive and significant suggesting that plants in 
more financially developed states are larger and so are plants in states with higher SDP/capita. 
Most of the interaction terms are insignificant. This can also be seen in Figure 9 where we plot 
the predictive margins of the interaction coefficients and find that financial development does 
not make a material difference to plant lifecycles in India. In col. 1 of Panel B, we take the ratios 
of the predicted margins in each age bin to that of the youngest firms (< 5), and find that plants 
in developed versus under-developed states are growing at very similar rates. In unreported tests 
we find similar results when we look at just the top 3 and bottom 3 states in terms of financial 
development. We also do not find evidence supporting the role of financial development for firm 
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lifecycle when we use a continuous measure of financial development, Credit/SDP, interacted 
with age dummies either. 
Insert Table 5 here 
In cols. 2-7 we investigate if the financial development of the state is more critical for firm 
lifecycle in some industries versus others. We look at large-firm dominated and labor intensive 
industries in col.2, large-firm dominated capital intensive industries in col. 3, small-firm 
dominated and labor intensive industries in col.4, small-firm dominated capital intensive 
industries in col. 5, industries not dependent on external finance in col.6 and industries 
dependent on external finance in col. 7.  
The financial development dummy is positive and significant in all specifications except in 
the case of small firm dominated, capital intensive industries. The predictive margins of the 
interaction coefficients in all the 6 columns are shown in Figure 10 where we see that firms in 
large-firm dominated labor intensive industries are larger at all ages in financially developed 
states versus underdeveloped states. In small-firm dominated labor intensive industries, plants 
start out larger in the financially developed states but for older plants we find that those in 
financially under-developed states are larger. In all other industry samples, we do not find 
striking differences between the financially developed and under-developed states. In cols. 2 -7 
of panel B we show the ratio of the predictive margins in each age bin to that of the youngest 
firms (< 5 years old). We find that plants are growing fastest in large firm dominated capital 
intensive industries and slowest in small-firm dominated labor intensive industries. Plants in 
industries that are dependent on external finance grow faster compared to plants in industries less 
dependent on external finance. However when we look at the differences across financial 
development, surprisingly we find that the older plants in financially under-developed states are 
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larger than youngest firms in those states compared to the size difference between old and young 
plants in financially developed states. 
Together Table 5 and figures 9-10 show that there are no significant differences in the 
lifecycle of Indian firms across financially developed and under-developed states and any key 
differences in size and growth rates that exist are at the industry level.  
 
 
C.1. Robustness 
 In this section we undertake a number of robustness tests to see if there is a differential 
effect of financial development on firm lifecycle. First, in col. 1 of Table 6, we explore whether 
the effect of financial development is larger for firms in the right tail of the size distribution by 
looking at firms at or above the 90th percentile in terms of size distribution.  Most of the 
interaction terms are insignificant suggesting only marginal differences in growth rates of these 
plants in financially developed versus under-developed states.  
Insert Table 6 here 
In cols. 2 and 3 we use alternate measures of our financial development indicator – in col. 
2 we use Commercial Bank Deposits/SDP as an alternate measure of financial depth and in col. 3 
we use Total number of bank branches/1000 persons as a measure of financial outreach. We once 
again split states each year into financially developed versus under-developed depending on the 
median value of these indicators across states. Cols. 2 and 3 show that the main effect of 
financial development is negative while the interaction effects with age are mostly insignificant. 
This is also seen in Figure 11 where we don’t find material differences between developed and 
under-developed states using these alternate indicators. 
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India has been known to have one of the most stringent formal labor laws in the world, 
and substantially more protective than the British labor laws along which it was originally 
modeled as discussed by Dougherty, Robles, and Krishna (2011). Several studies have shown 
that stringent labor regulations have been associated with lower levels of manufacturing output, 
employment, and labor productivity (e.g. Besley and Burgess, 2004; Aghion et al., 2008; Ahsan 
and Pages, 2009). In cols. 4 and 5 of Table 6, we examine if the effect of financial development 
on plant lifecycle is different in states with flexible labor regulations versus states with stringent 
labor regulations following the classification in Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar (2008). While the 
main effect of financial development is positive and significant in flexible states it is negative 
and significant in the inflexible states. However, all the interaction coefficients of age with 
financial development are positive and significant in states with rigid labor regulations. To better 
interpret the interaction coefficients, we look at the predictive margins with the 95% confidence 
bands for the interaction coefficients in Figure 12. We find that among the plants in states with 
rigid labor regulations, those in financially developed states are larger than those in financially 
under-developed states. The differences across financial development are less stark in states with 
flexible labor regulations.  
In cols. 6 and 7 of Table 6, we next investigate if the role of financial development differs 
across differing periods of industrial policy. Following India’s independence in 1947, the 1951 
Industries Development and Regulation Act introduced a system of industrial licensing that came 
to be known as the “license raj”, which regulated and restricted the entry of new firms and 
expansion of existing firms. With the Indian economy being stagnant over several decades, a 
series of liberalization reforms were introduced by the Government starting in the 80s which 
included de-licensing of industries. A third of the industries were de-licensed during the period 
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1985-1987 and most of the others in 1991. Aghion et al. (2008) provide information on each 
three-digit industry that was de-licensed over the period 1980-1997. We extend their data to the 
end of our sample period till 2005 to identify firms that were born after their industry was de-
licensed. In col. 6 of Table 6 we look at the interaction of FD and age for firms born after the 
period of de-licensing. Since the earliest de-licensing year in our sample starts in 1985, we only 
have the first19 years of firm life-cycle and hence use interactions of FD with each year of age. 
The predictive margins of the interaction coefficients are in Figure 13. We find that while the age 
coefficients are mostly positive and significant, the FD dummy is not significant and neither are 
the interaction terms. Figure 13 also shows that there does not seem to be much difference in the 
early lifecycle of firms born after de-licensing in financially developed versus under-developed 
states. While firms in financially developed states seem to be born larger, the difference is not 
maintained over time.  
In col. 7 of Table 6 we examine if there is a differential effect of state-level financial 
development on plants born after India’s financial liberalization in 1991. Since the last year of 
data in our sample is 2005, we have 14 years of firms’ lifecycle for the firms born after 
liberalization. Once again most of the interaction terms are not significant. Figure 14 plots the 
predictive margins of the interaction coefficients along with the 95% confidence intervals. We 
find that while firms in financially developed states start out larger than firms in financially 
under-developed states in the period before liberalization, these differences do not persist over 
time. We do not find any material difference in the lifecycle of plants born after liberalization in 
financially developed versus under-developed states.  
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In unreported tests we do not find significant differences in early plant lifecycle between 
states with high versus low levels of financial development even before industry de-licensing or 
liberalization. 
 
C.2. Intensive vs. Extensive Margins 
The above section shows that despite great variation within the country, financial 
institutions have limited explanatory power for plant lifecycle in India. In this section we 
examine if the financial institutions have a differential effect on the extensive margin (Number of 
Plants) versus intensive margin (Avg Employment/Plant). 
In Figure 15, we plot the proportion of employment in financially developed states in 
each bin (EM-developed) and the proportion of employment in financially under-developed 
states in each bin (EM-Underdeveloped). We find marginal differences between financially 
developed versus under-developed states. Across both categories of states, the 5-9 aged firms 
have the highest proportion of employment after which it declines. So older plants have smaller 
employment shares though the oldest age group of 40+ have higher employment shares than 
middle-aged plants between 20-39 years of age Next, for each age bin in financially developed 
states we take the ratio of total number of employees to total number of firms to give us the 
intensive margin (IM-developed) and repeat the same for the under-developed states to obtain 
IM-Underdeveloped. While older firms have higher employment/ firm ratio, we don’t find 
significant differences across financially developed versus under-developed states. All our 
results hold if we were to take sampling weights into account and examine the intensive and 
extensive margin in the population. 
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D. Informal Manufacturing Sector 
In this section we study the size-age gap in the informal manufacturing sector in India. In 
a recent paper using World Bank Enterprise survey data for the informal sector, La Porta and 
Shleifer (2008) show that informal firms look very different from formal firms in terms of size, 
productivity, and education level of managers and find little evidence that growth occurs by 
informal firms eventually becoming large formal firms. They interpret their findings as being 
consistent with the dual economy view (e.g. Harris and Todaro, 1970) which predicts that in 
developing countries, in addition to the formal sector, there is an informal sector that employs a 
large section of the labor force.  
Figure 16 presents the sample statistics for firm size across different age bins, combining 
the data for both the rural and urban sectors. We see that older firms in the unorganized 
manufacturing sector employ fewer people than firms younger than 5 years old. Thus firms in the 
informal manufacturing sector in India have a very different lifecycle than the firms in the formal 
manufacturing sector. The downward sloping age size profile in the informal sector is consistent 
with the description of the informal sector in La Porta and Shleifer (2008). 
In unreported statistics, we examine if financial development has an impact on lifecycles 
in the informal manufacturing sector. Again we find no evidence that informal manufacturing 
plants in financially developed states are growing at a faster rate than informal plants in 
financially under-developed states. 
 
E. Reconciling our results with the Finance and Growth Literature 
The analysis above shows that firms in the formal manufacturing sector in India grow as 
they age and the quality of financial institutions at the state level does not seem have to an 
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differential impact on the growth rates of firms across different states. In this section we try to 
provide additional insight into why we are finding seemingly different results from the vast 
finance and growth literature that has established a causal impact of finance on firm growth. 
First, our results may be reflecting the low level of financial development of the country 
overall. On the one hand, states within India exhibit large differences in income and quality of 
institutions. On the other hand, India does not rank very high in terms of financial development 
in the global economy along a number of different indicators. According to the Global Financial 
Inclusion (2011) database, only 35% of adults in India have an account at a formal financial 
institution and only 11% of adults save at a financial institution giving India a rank above 75 
along both dimensions in a sample of 147 countries. In terms of private credit provided by 
deposit money banks as a share of GDP, India ranked 52 out of 103 economies in 1983 at the 
beginning of our sample period and 69 out of 171 economies in 2005, the end of our sample 
period. Thus it may be the case that the Indian banking system seems to be uncompetitive and 
inefficient according to global rankings making within country differences marginal. If lending 
decisions are politicized, financial development as captured by bank credit to state domestic 
product is not likely to be very meaningful.  Indeed, Rajan and Prasad (2008) also emphasize that 
the Indian financial sector if “unleashed from government strictures” can have an “enormous 
multiplier effect on economic growth.”  
Second, it could be that there are other exacerbating factors in the economy such as 
corruption or infrastructure weaknesses that are greater in magnitude than the differences in 
financial sector development across states which we are not focusing on in this paper.  
Finally it could be that firm idiosyncratic factors such as managerial skill (e.g. Bloom, 
Eifert, Mahajan, Mckenzie, and Roberts, 2013) or firm characteristics at birth (e.g. Ayyagari, 
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Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2013) may be more important than the institutional 
environment in influencing firm lifecycles in developing countries. More research is needed to 
understand the role of institutions versus firm specific characteristics in determining the 
lifecycles of firms in developing countries. 
 
IV Conclusion 
 An understanding of the relationship between size and age or lifecycle effects is crucial to 
both fundamental corporate finance policies at the level of the firm as well as productivity 
differences across firms and countries. In this paper we examine the role of financial institutions 
in influencing firm life-cycle in a developing country, India, which shows substantial variation in 
regional financial development according to standard measures used in the literature.  
While Indian firms grow as they age and older firms are important contributors to 
employment, we find that the differences in financial development across Indian states only 
modestly affect the life-cycles of established firms in most industries. The one exception is firms 
in large-firm dominated labor intensive industries, which are larger in financially developed 
states versus underdeveloped states. We also find that plants in financially developed states that 
have rigid labor market regulations are larger than plants in financially under-developed states 
with rigid labor market regulations. We do not find financial development to have a big impact 
on either the intensive (employment/firm) or extensive margin (number of firms). Our results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that majority government-owned banking systems like the one 
India has, is not an effective way of employing the financial system to support economic growth. 
Our results may also suggest that in India, other institutional factors or firm idiosyncratic factors 
may be playing a more dominant role than differences in financial institutions in explaining firm 
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life-cycle. Given that we find the size-age ratio of Indian firms is not as large as that of the 
developed countries such as the US, more research is needed to understand the underlying 
factors that may play a role in determining the life-cycle of firms. 
Our findings have important policy implications for financial sector reforms. Using 
standard measures of size and depth, we find an insignificant role for financial development in 
influencing firm life-cycle across different regions in India.  This may be because size and depth 
differences in financial development across Indian states are likely dwarfed by overall 
inefficiencies that generally characterize state-dominated financial systems.  This suggests the 
need for increasing competition and the private sector share of the banking system through 
further liberalization and reducing state control, which may help improve efficiency of credit 
allocation by reducing political interference.   
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Figure 1: Firm Size and Age – Sample Estimates  
 
Source: ASI Data for following individual census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
 
Figure 2: Firm Size and Age – Population Estimates  
 
Source: ASI Data for following individual census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
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Figure 3: Firm Size and Age  – Census Sample 
 
Source: ASI Data for following individual census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
 
Figure 4: Firm Size and Age  – Pooled Regression Sample 
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
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Figure 5: Size of young firms over the years 
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
 
 
Figure 6: Firm Size and Age: Industry Heterogeneity 
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
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Figure 7: Firm Size and Age: Small/Large Firm and Labor/Capital Intensive  
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
 
 
Figure 8: Firm Size and Age: External Finance Dependence 
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
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Figure 9: Firm Size and Age: Role of Financial Development 
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
 
 
Figure 10: Firm Size and Age: Role of Financial Development across Industries 
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
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Figure 11: Firm Size and Age: Alternate Indicators of Financial Development 
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
 
Figure 12: Firm Size and Age: Role of Financial Development in Flexible vs Inflexible 
States 
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
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Figure 13: Firm Size and Age: Role of Financial Development after De-licensing 
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
 
Figure 14: Firm Size and Age: Role of Financial Development after Liberalization 
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/05 
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Figure 15: Financial Institutions and Intensive (IM) versus Extensive Margin (EM) 
 
Source: ASI Data pooled from the following census years: 1983/84, 1989/90, 1994/95, 2000/01, 2004/0 
 
Figure 16: Firm Employment by Age – Informal Sector in India 
 
Source: NSS 1994/95 
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Table 1: Institutional Variation across Indian States 
Panel A presents data on financial development across different states of India for each of the census years in our sample. 
Credit/SDP is the ratio of Total Bank Credit to Net State Domestic Product. FD is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
state-years that are at or higher than the median value of Credit/SDP across states in a given census year. Panel B classifies states 
based on the stringency of labor regulations and is from Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar (2008). Flexible is a dummy variable that 
takes 1 for states with flexible labor regulations and 0 for states with rigid labor market regulations. 
Panel A: Financial Development across States 
Year 1983 1989 1994 2000 2004 
State Credit/SDP FD Credit/SDP FD Credit/SDP FD Credit/SDP FD Credit/SDP FD 
Assam 0.073 0 0.118 0 0.102 0 0.119 0 0.171 0 
Bihar 0.120 0 0.145 0 0.144 0 0.166 0 0.259 0 
Uttar Pradesh 0.149 0 0.169 0 0.156 0 0.172 0 0.267 0 
Haryana 0.187 0 0.184 0 0.155 0 0.181 0 0.273 0 
Gujarat 0.190 1 0.245 1 0.210 1 0.296 1 0.322 0 
West Bengal 0.273 1 0.287 1 0.283 1 0.238 1 0.342 0 
Orissa 0.115 0 0.168 0 0.155 0 0.172 0 0.357 0 
Punjab 0.229 1 0.221 1 0.231 1 0.286 1 0.364 1 
Rajasthan 0.150 0 0.176 0 0.145 0 0.206 0 0.374 1 
Madhya Pradesh 0.122 0 0.180 0 0.166 0 0.197 0 0.418 1 
Andhra Pradesh 0.222 1 0.272 1 0.262 1 0.316 1 0.438 1 
Kerala 0.293 1 0.345 1 0.330 1 0.366 1 0.555 1 
Karnataka 0.291 1 0.385 1 0.330 1 0.383 1 0.666 1 
Tamil Nadu 0.351 1 0.396 1 0.424 1 0.522 1 0.733 1 
Maharashtra 0.477 1 0.417 1 0.497 1 0.659 1 1.148 1 
Panel B: Stringency of Labor Regulations across States 
State name Flexible State 
Andhra Pradesh 1 
Delhi 1 
Gujarat 1 
Haryana 1 
Himachal Pradesh 1 
Karnataka 1 
Madhya Pradesh 1 
Maharashtra 1 
Punjab 1 
Rajasthan 1 
Uttar Pradesh 1 
Assam 0 
Bihar 0 
Chhattisgarh 0 
Goa 0 
Jharkhand 0 
Kerala 0 
Orissa 0 
Tamil Nadu 0 
Uttaranchal 0 
West Bengal 0 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics and Correlations  
The variables are defined as follows: Firm Size is the total number of workers which includes workers employed directly, workers employed 
through contractors, supervisory and managerial staff, other employees, working proprietors, unpaid family workers, and unpaid working 
members if cooperative factory. Firm Size Ratio is the ratio of each firm’s firm size scaled by the average firm size of all firms in its birth cohort 
year. Age Dummies consists of dummy variables for the following 9 age bins - <5, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40+ - and 
is defined as the year of the survey - year of initial production reported by the firms. Small Firm Industry takes the value 1 if industry’s share of 
employment in firms with less than 20 employees is ≥ median value of the Index of small firm domination from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, 
and Levine (2008) and takes the value 0 if it is < the median index value.  EFD is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if industry’s 
dependence on external finance is ≥ median value of the Index of External Finance Dependence and takes the value 0 if it is < the median of the 
Index of External Finance Dependence. The Index of External Finance Dependence is computed  for US industries over the period 1980-
2005following the procedure in Rajan and Zingales (1998).  Labor Intensive Industries is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for labor 
intensive industries and 0 for capital intensive industries and is from Hasan and Jandoc (2012). FD is dummy variable that takes value 1 for 
financially developed states and 0 otherwise. Flexible state is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for states with flexible labor regulations 
and 0 for states with stringent labor regulations and is from Gupta, Hasan, and Kumar (2008).  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Firm Size 221029 121.51 238.36 1 1616 
Firm Size Ratio 106362 1.38 2.64 0.01 30.44 
Age Dummies 228904 3.78 2.40 1 9 
Small Firm Industry 217596 0.62 0.48 0 1 
Labor Intensive 228904 0.23 0.42 0 1 
EFD 227123 0.42 0.49 0 1 
FD 208963 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Flexible State 220811 0.69 0.46 0 1 
a and b represent significance at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
  
Firm Size Firm Size Ratio 
Age 
Dummies 
Small Firm 
Industry 
Labor 
Intensive EFD FD 
Firm Size Ratio 0.962*** 
      Age Dummies 0.221*** 0.132*** 
     Small Firm Industry -0.101*** -0.085*** 0.025*** 
    Labor Intensive -0.04*** -0.004 -0.085*** 0.063*** 
   EFD -0.066*** -0.053*** -0.007*** -0.019*** -0.163*** 
  FD 0.024*** 0.012*** -0.022*** -0.01*** -0.050*** 0.001 
 Flexible State -0.021*** 0.014*** -0.107*** -0.054*** -0.051*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 3: Firm Size and Age  
This table shows results from the following regression: Firm Size/Size Ratio = α + β1 Age Dummies + β2 State Dummies + β3Year Dummies + 
β4Industry Dummies + e. Firm Size is the total number of workers which includes workers employed directly, workers employed through 
contractors, supervisory and managerial staff, other employees, working proprietors, unpaid family workers, and unpaid working members if 
cooperative factory. Firm Size Ratio is the ratio of each firm’s firm size scaled by the average firm size of all firms in its birth cohort year. Age 
Dummies consist of 9 age dummies for the following age bins: <5(reference category), 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40+.  
Year Dummies consist of dummies for each of the years in which the census is conducted. State Dummies are 32 dummies for states in which the 
firms are located. Industry dummies are 3 digit NIC dummies for manufacturing industries. All regressions are estimated by ordinary least 
squares. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The square brackets in cols. 1 and 2 contain a ratio of the mean size of the particular 
age bin to the mean size in the age bin with youngest (<5) firms. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Ratio Firm Size Ratio 
5-9 11.531*** 12.777*** 0.377*** 0.421*** 
 
(1.026) (1.026) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
[1.149] [1.258] 
  10-14 21.942*** 24.367*** 0.636*** 0.833*** 
 
(1.189) (1.195) (0.023) (0.024) 
 
[1.284] [1.493] 
  15-19 34.544*** 37.649*** 0.884*** 1.200*** 
 
(1.452) (1.465) (0.040) (0.042) 
 
[1.447] [1.762] 
  20-24 48.060*** 53.217*** 1.419*** 1.862*** 
 
(1.816) (1.814) (0.075) (0.076) 
 
[1.622] [2.076] 
  25-29 66.018*** 70.194*** 
  
 
(2.370) (2.351) 
  
 
[1.855] [2.420] 
  30-34 89.781*** 93.613*** 
  
 
(3.142) (3.101) 
  
 
[2.163] [2.894] 
  35-39 110.703*** 114.692*** 
  
 
(4.068) (3.985) 
  
 
[2.434] [3.320] 
  40+ 214.261*** 207.637*** 
  
 
(3.335) (3.349) 
  
 
[3.775] [5.200] 
  Constant 77.205*** 49.436** 1.000*** 0.282 
 
(0.717) (25.092) (0.009) (0.385) 
State Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
Year Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
Industry Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
N 221029 221020 106362 106362 
Adjusted R-square 0.057 0.107 0.018 0.063 
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 4: Technological differences across industries  
Panel A shows results from the following regression: Firm Size = α + β1 Age Dummies + β2 Labor Intensive Dummy+ β3 Small Firm Dominated 
Dummy + β4 EFD + β5 Age Dummies x Labor Intensive Dummy + β6 Age Dummies x Small Firm Dominated + β7 Age Dummies x EFD + β8 Age 
Dummies x Labor Intensive Dummy x Small Firm Dominated Dummy + β9Year Dummies + β10 State Dummies + e. In Panel B, we present 
ratios of the predicted margins of the interaction coefficients (from the regressions in panel A) of each age bin with that of the youngest firms 
(<5) as an estimate of growth rates. Firm Size is the total number of workers which includes workers employed directly, workers employed 
through contractors, supervisory and managerial staff, other employees, working proprietors, unpaid family workers, and unpaid working 
members if cooperative factory. Age Dummies consist of 9 age dummies for the following age bins: <5(reference category), 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 
20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40+.  Year Dummies consist of dummies for each of the years in which the census is conducted. Labor Intensive 
Dummy takes the value 1 for labor intensive industries and 0 for capital intensive industries and is from Hasan and Jandoc (2012). Small Firm 
Dominated Industry is from Beck et al. (2008) and takes the value 1 for small firm (≤20 employees) dominated industries and 0 otherwise. EFD 
takes the value 1 for industries that are highly dependent on external finance and 0 for industries that are not highly dependent on external 
finance. State Dummies are 32 dummies for states in which the firms are located. All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
 
Panel A:  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size 
5-9 15.213*** 12.532*** 19.265*** 7.398*** 
 
(1.884) (1.216) (2.177) (1.322) 
10-14 33.317*** 22.839*** 34.450*** 13.887*** 
 
(2.281) (1.385) (2.539) (1.510) 
15-19 52.117*** 35.269*** 55.066*** 22.635*** 
 
(2.877) (1.681) (3.173) (1.814) 
20-24 70.595*** 52.684*** 77.838*** 34.073*** 
 
(3.573) (2.107) (3.993) (2.291) 
25-29 95.773*** 70.069*** 102.336*** 45.453*** 
 
(4.803) (2.713) (5.282) (2.921) 
30-34 114.397*** 95.959*** 125.371*** 66.157*** 
 
(5.997) (3.610) (6.751) (3.880) 
35-39 154.768*** 118.498*** 171.340*** 89.405*** 
 
(7.919) (4.590) (8.886) (5.231) 
40+ 360.350*** 234.465*** 407.587*** 151.009*** 
 
(7.258) (3.885) (8.273) (3.710) 
Small Firm Industry -13.650*** 
 
-18.131***  
 
(1.572) 
 
(1.840)  
5-9 x Small Firm Industry -7.588*** 
 
-10.143***  
 
(2.252) 
 
(2.615)  
10-14  x Small Firm Industry -20.697*** 
 
-18.396***  
 
(2.664) 
 
(2.993)  
15-19  x Small Firm Industry -32.065*** 
 
-30.378***  
 
(3.308) 
 
(3.684)  
20-24  x Small Firm Industry -38.986*** 
 
-39.601***  
 
(4.110) 
 
(4.625)  
25-29  x Small Firm Industry -52.444*** 
 
-50.693***  
 
(5.448) 
 
(6.050)  
30-34  x Small Firm Industry -47.235*** 
 
-46.413***  
 
(6.997) 
 
(7.928)  
35-39  x Small Firm Industry -74.887*** 
 
-83.104***  
 
(9.099) 
 
(10.212)  
40+  x Small Firm Industry -231.268*** 
 
-268.560***  
 
(7.958) 
 
(9.032)  
Labor Intensive Industry 
 
10.239*** 2.527  
  
(1.555) (2.995)  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size 
5-9 x Labor Intensive Industry 
 
-8.146*** -19.618***  
  
(2.244) (4.245)  
10-14  x Labor Intensive Industry 
 
-9.875*** -5.310  
  
(2.743) (5.853)  
15-19  x Labor Intensive Industry 
 
-14.820*** -15.620**  
  
(3.440) (7.523)  
20-24  x Labor Intensive Industry 
 
-30.227*** -40.982***  
  
(4.178) (8.740)  
25-29  x Labor Intensive Industry 
 
-33.089*** -36.561***  
  
(5.612) (12.611)  
30-34  x Labor Intensive Industry 
 
-48.415*** -58.239***  
  
(7.096) (14.313)  
35-39  x Labor Intensive Industry 
 
-48.894*** -87.864***  
  
(9.646) (19.055)  
40+  x Labor Intensive Industry 
 
-115.782*** -254.272***  
  
(7.610) (15.383)  
Labor Intensive Industry x Small Firm Industry 
  
12.701***  
   
(3.558)  
5-9 x Labor Intensive Industry x Small Firm Industry 
  
17.484***  
   
(5.070)  
10-14  x Labor Intensive Industry  x Small Firm Industry 
  
-2.761  
   
(6.692)  
15-19  x Labor Intensive Industry  x Small Firm Industry 
  
3.060  
   
(8.495)  
20-24  x Labor Intensive Industry  x Small Firm Industry 
  
18.496*  
   
(9.999)  
25-29  x Labor Intensive Industry  x Small Firm Industry 
  
5.958  
   
(14.001)  
30-34  x Labor Intensive Industry  x Small Firm Industry 
  
7.321  
   
(16.370)  
35-39  x Labor Intensive Industry  x Small Firm Industry 
  
55.759**  
   
(22.035)  
40+  x Labor Intensive Industry  x Small Firm Industry 
  
209.643***  
   
(17.456)  
EFD    1.086 
    (1.469) 
5-9 x EFD    6.190*** 
    (2.067) 
10-14 x EFD    13.199*** 
    (2.403) 
15-19 x EFD    19.643*** 
    (2.954) 
20-24 x EFD    26.549*** 
    (3.698) 
25-29 x EFD    37.353*** 
    (4.822) 
30-34 x EFD    42.218*** 
    (6.385) 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size 
35-39 x EFD    42.497*** 
    (8.220) 
40+  x EFD    157.612*** 
    (7.345) 
Constant 67.859*** 48.003* 68.821*** 58.993** 
 
(24.826) (24.729) (25.189) (24.353) 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO 
N 210044 221020 210044 219282 
Adjusted R-Square 0.093 0.070 0.099 0.077 
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel B: Ratio of Predictive Margins of each age bin to the reference group (<5 firms) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Age 
Large-
Firm  
Small 
Firm  Capital  Labor  
Large-
Firm, 
Capital 
Intensive 
Small-
Firm, 
Capital 
Intensive 
Large-
Firm, 
Labor 
Intensive 
Small-
Firm, 
Labor 
Intensive 
Low 
Depende
nce on 
External 
Finance 
High 
Dependenc
e on 
External 
Finance 
<5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5-9 1.17 1.10 1.16 1.05 1.22 1.13 1.00 1.08 1.09 1.17 
10-14 1.38 1.17 1.30 1.15 1.40 1.23 1.33 1.09 1.18 1.34 
15-19 1.59 1.27 1.46 1.24 1.63 1.36 1.44 1.14 1.29 1.53 
20-24 1.80 1.43 1.69 1.26 1.89 1.56 1.41 1.19 1.43 1.76 
25-29 2.09 1.59 1.92 1.43 2.18 1.75 1.73 1.25 1.58 2.04 
30-34 2.30 1.91 2.26 1.55 2.44 2.15 1.75 1.33 1.84 2.36 
35-39 2.76 2.08 2.56 1.81 2.97 2.28 1.93 1.67 2.14 2.66 
40+ 5.11 2.74 4.08 2.38 5.69 3.02 2.71 2.12 2.93 4.89 
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Table 5: Role of Financial Development  
The regression equation estimated in Panel A is Firm Size  = α + β1 Age Dummies + β2FD  + β3 FD x Age Dummies + β4 Year Dummies  + β5 
Industry Dummies  + β6 Log SDP/Capita + e. In Panel B, we present ratios of the predicted margins of the interaction coefficients (from the 
regressions in panel A) of each age bin with that of the youngest firms (<5) as an estimate of growth rates. Firm Size is the total number of 
workers which includes workers employed directly, workers employed through contractors, supervisory and managerial staff, other employees, 
working proprietors, unpaid family workers, and unpaid working members if cooperative factory. Age Dummies consist of 9 age dummies for the 
following age bins: <5(reference category), 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40+.  FD is dummy variable that takes value 1 for 
financially developed states and 0 otherwise. Year Dummies consist of dummies for each of the years in which the census is conducted. Industry 
dummies are 3 digit NIC dummies for manufacturing industries. All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A:  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size 
    
Large Firm 
Dominated, 
Labor 
Intensive 
Small Firm 
Dominated, 
Labor 
Intensive 
Large Firm 
Dominated, 
Capital 
Intensive 
Small Firm 
Dominated, 
Capital 
Intensive 
Not 
Dependent on 
External 
Finance 
Dependent on 
External 
Finance 
5-9 14.331*** 15.889** 5.316 24.638*** 8.513*** 11.700*** 14.200*** 
 
(1.823) (7.263) (3.687) (4.062) (2.604) (2.135) (3.049) 
10-14 30.379*** 33.735*** 8.990** 47.782*** 21.930*** 23.330*** 34.817*** 
 
(2.197) (8.894) (4.533) (5.106) (2.955) (2.490) (3.780) 
15-19 41.611*** 22.287** 12.440** 65.657*** 28.207*** 28.903*** 47.337*** 
 
(2.703) (10.490) (5.507) (6.354) (3.622) (3.039) (4.748) 
20-24 56.823*** 35.436*** 26.174*** 86.911*** 39.571*** 37.154*** 70.568*** 
 
(3.443) (11.974) (7.775) (8.265) (4.552) (3.945) (6.147) 
25-29 68.594*** 49.792*** 30.665*** 105.893*** 46.905*** 42.034*** 88.580*** 
 
(4.488) (17.946) (10.150) (11.049) (5.610) (4.905) (8.245) 
30-34 88.962*** 37.314*** 52.918*** 126.531*** 71.326*** 64.148*** 107.396*** 
 
(5.882) (14.458) (15.155) (14.266) (7.589) (6.665) (10.619) 
35-39 102.120*** 24.865* 96.669*** 166.647*** 65.038*** 75.633*** 123.904*** 
 
(7.319) (12.891) (19.919) (18.463) (8.560) (8.396) (13.250) 
40+ 210.194*** 166.776*** 144.789*** 467.598*** 151.684*** 176.468*** 332.947*** 
 
(5.565) (21.469) (15.116) (17.174) (5.028) (5.398) (12.991) 
FD 6.439*** 58.656*** 18.656*** 11.155*** 3.492 13.047*** 9.382*** 
 
(1.694) (6.378) (3.594) (3.533) (2.533) (2.049) (2.750) 
5-9 x FD -3.168 -17.247** 0.249 -10.257** -0.993 -7.743*** -2.620 
 
(2.286) (8.463) (5.140) (4.968) (3.287) (2.844) (3.706) 
10-14 x FD -9.143*** -3.477 -4.803 -20.888*** -10.945*** -15.101*** -12.742*** 
 
(2.686) (11.160) (6.167) (6.000) (3.650) (3.273) (4.446) 
15-19 x FD -5.745* 16.050 -4.692 -16.293** -5.709 -11.049*** -7.385 
 
(3.277) (13.587) (7.531) (7.477) (4.391) (3.936) (5.561) 
20-24 x FD -3.739 -3.805 -22.296** -10.747 -1.917 -5.904 -11.727* 
 
(4.127) (15.791) (9.580) (9.616) (5.478) (5.004) (7.105) 
25-29 x FD 6.109 24.540 -18.736 0.444 8.547 5.667 -3.214 
 
(5.375) (23.588) (12.286) (12.834) (6.815) (6.308) (9.493) 
30-34 x FD 11.472 47.720** -40.640** 4.708 14.481 5.865 6.771 
 
(7.079) (23.270) (17.018) (16.453) (9.375) (8.478) (12.315) 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size 
    
Large Firm 
Dominated, 
Labor 
Intensive 
Small Firm 
Dominated, 
Labor 
Intensive 
Large Firm 
Dominated, 
Capital 
Intensive 
Small Firm 
Dominated, 
Capital 
Intensive 
Not 
Dependent on 
External 
Finance 
Dependent on 
External 
Finance 
35-39 x FD 22.965** 97.683*** -61.149*** 17.203 33.776*** 25.683** 15.948 
 
(8.932) (28.157) (23.278) (21.439) (10.893) (11.084) (15.347) 
40+  x FD -0.685 -5.424 -69.092*** -70.629*** -23.561*** -41.980*** -19.764 
 
(6.974) (27.594) (17.674) (19.779) (7.005) (7.358) (15.090) 
Log SDP/Capita 3.325* -38.255*** -4.200 -6.697* 4.516** 6.395*** -7.087** 
 
(1.795) (7.329) (3.319) (4.063) (2.304) (2.126) (2.935) 
Constant -15.480 288.294*** 78.652*** 110.535*** 10.728 -7.156 109.595*** 
 
(13.822) (55.267) (25.320) (31.338) (17.561) (16.116) (22.576) 
State Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Industry Fixed 
Effects YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 201796 14121 27662 58965 90974 108303 91801 
Adjusted R-square 0.105 0.067 0.026 0.131 0.045 0.049 0.091 
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel B: Ratio of Predictive Margins of each age bin to the reference group (<5 firms) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Age FD 
Full 
Sample 
Large-Firm 
Dominated, 
Labor 
Intensive 
Small-Firm 
Dominated, 
Labor 
Intensive 
Large-Firm 
Dominated, 
Capital 
Intensive 
Small-Firm 
Dominated, 
Capital 
Intensive 
Low 
Dependence 
on External 
Finance 
High 
Dependence 
on External 
Finance 
<5 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5-9 0 1.19 1.15 1.09 1.26 1.11 1.16 1.16 
10-14 0 1.41 1.41 1.12 1.51 1.29 1.32 1.40 
15-19 0 1.56 1.32 1.17 1.74 1.40 1.41 1.57 
20-24 0 1.76 1.50 1.35 1.96 1.53 1.50 1.84 
25-29 0 1.92 1.78 1.44 2.20 1.65 1.59 2.09 
30-34 0 2.20 1.54 1.71 2.43 1.99 1.89 2.31 
35-39 0 2.37 1.27 2.30 2.87 1.89 2.04 2.50 
40+ 0 3.83 3.64 2.94 6.32 3.11 3.43 5.10 
<5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5-9 1 1.14 0.98 1.06 1.16 1.11 1.05 1.14 
10-14 1 1.26 1.32 1.05 1.28 1.16 1.10 1.25 
15-19 1 1.44 1.41 1.09 1.53 1.32 1.22 1.47 
20-24 1 1.66 1.37 1.03 1.79 1.51 1.37 1.67 
25-29 1 1.92 1.76 1.13 2.14 1.76 1.58 2.00 
30-34 1 2.24 1.85 1.14 2.40 2.18 1.84 2.34 
35-39 1 2.55 2.20 1.38 2.96 2.33 2.20 2.62 
40+ 1 3.59 2.63 1.83 5.25 2.75 2.61 4.65 
53 
 
Table 6: Role of Financial Development –Robustness 
The regression equation estimated in this table is Firm Size  = α + β1 Age Dummies + β2FD  + β3 FD x Age Dummies + β4 Year Dummies  + β5 Industry Dummies  + β6 Log SDP/Capita + e. Firm Size is 
the total number of workers which includes workers employed directly, workers employed through contractors, supervisory and managerial staff, other employees, working proprietors, unpaid family 
workers, and unpaid working members if cooperative factory. Age Dummies consist of 9 age dummies for the following age bins: <5(reference category), 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 
and 40+.  In cols. 6 and 7 we use dummies for each year of age. FD is dummy variable that takes value 1 for financially developed states and 0 otherwise and is defined by Total Bank Credit/SDP in 
cols. 1, 4-9. In Cols. 2 and 3 we use alternate measures of financial development namely Bank Deposits/SDP and Branches/1000 persons respectively. In cols. 4 and 5 we split the sample into states with 
states with flexible (pro-employer) labor regulation and states with rigid labor regulations respectively. In cols. 6 and 7 we focus on early life-cycle by looking at firms born after de-licensing of 
industries (col.6) and after liberalization in 1991 (col.7). The de-licensing of industries varies by industry-year. Year Dummies consist of dummies for each of the years in which the census is conducted. 
Industry dummies are 3 digit NIC dummies for manufacturing industries. All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size 
  
Above 90th 
percentile of size 
distribution 
Alternate Measure 
of FD: Deposits/ 
SDP 
Alternate Measure 
of FD: Branches/ 
1000 per 
Flexible 
States 
Inflexible 
States 
Firms born after 
de-licensing 
Firms born 
after 
Liberalization  
5-9 44.421** 10.512*** 14.297*** 16.760*** -1.962  
 
 
(18.046) (1.502) (1.575) (2.020) (4.232)  
 10-14 78.741*** 25.548*** 29.738*** 32.465*** 10.783**  
 
 
(18.952) (1.785) (1.872) (2.454) (5.017)  
 15-19 112.084*** 38.209*** 40.179*** 43.732*** 22.989***  
 
 
(19.963) (2.244) (2.266) (3.059) (5.846)  
 20-24 143.166*** 56.284*** 54.926*** 57.591*** 41.469***  
 
 
(21.191) (2.885) (2.767) (3.943) (7.175)  
 25-29 213.063*** 67.442*** 68.158*** 67.917*** 57.572***  
 
 
(24.056) (3.732) (3.530) (5.223) (8.902)  
 30-34 245.911*** 94.524*** 92.119*** 90.014*** 73.105***  
 
 
(26.879) (5.096) (4.547) (6.995) (10.953)  
 35-39 199.345*** 125.308*** 115.839*** 97.663*** 103.137***  
 
 
(29.328) (6.655) (6.078) (8.782) (13.270)  
 40+ 284.614*** 194.276*** 210.234*** 256.951*** 171.069***  
 
 
(18.084) (4.836) (4.538) (8.451) (7.970)  
 FD -46.502*** -4.516*** -3.839** 7.049*** -21.824*** 23.852 14.996 
 
(17.177) (1.698) (1.885) (1.945) (4.689) (16.910) (20.575) 
5-9 x FD -8.142 4.243* -3.988* -5.741** 15.755***  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size 
  
Above 90th 
percentile of size 
distribution 
Alternate Measure 
of FD: Deposits/ 
SDP 
Alternate Measure 
of FD: Branches/ 
1000 per 
Flexible 
States 
Inflexible 
States 
Firms born after 
de-licensing 
Firms born 
after 
Liberalization  
 
(21.429) (2.210) (2.195) (2.636) (4.877)  
 10-14 x FD -24.319 -1.578 -10.588*** -11.090*** 14.600**  
 
 
(22.360) (2.537) (2.525) (3.115) (5.680)  
 15-19 x FD -21.482 0.226 -4.348 -8.680** 20.307***  
 
 
(23.587) (3.085) (3.069) (3.863) (6.587)  
 20-24 x FD -16.547 -2.342 -0.729 -5.020 19.844**  
 
 
(25.083) (3.853) (3.818) (4.892) (8.094)  
 25-29 x FD -60.795** 10.857** 9.780** 3.573 29.529***  
 
 
(27.924) (5.005) (4.967) (6.490) (10.027)  
 30-34 x FD -30.693 5.584 10.499 3.347 44.583***  
 
 
(31.155) (6.663) (6.573) (8.630) (12.660)  
 35-39 x FD 25.928 -10.728 5.143 20.275* 40.031***  
 
 
(34.000) (8.584) (8.426) (11.099) (15.380)  
 40+  x FD 55.745** 29.195*** -1.033 -35.073*** 33.266***  
 
 
(22.028) (6.744) (6.919) (10.420) (9.637)  
 1 year 
     
6.585 9.971 
      
(12.186) (17.144) 
2 years 
     
15.490 21.404 
      
(12.194) (17.100) 
3 years 
     
25.653** 30.796* 
      
(12.359) (17.154) 
4 years 
     
25.079** 35.437** 
      
(12.416) (17.687) 
5 years 
     
24.661* 44.715** 
      
(12.736) (17.843) 
6 years 
     
23.386* 32.721* 
55 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size 
  
Above 90th 
percentile of size 
distribution 
Alternate Measure 
of FD: Deposits/ 
SDP 
Alternate Measure 
of FD: Branches/ 
1000 per 
Flexible 
States 
Inflexible 
States 
Firms born after 
de-licensing 
Firms born 
after 
Liberalization  
      
(12.443) (17.279) 
7 years 
     
25.538** 29.796* 
      
(12.768) (17.520) 
8 years 
     
42.140*** 59.748*** 
      
(13.417) (18.592) 
9 years 
     
46.552*** 62.719*** 
      
(13.632) (18.317) 
10 year 
     
30.092** 46.310** 
      
(14.511) (18.467) 
11 years 
     
64.580*** 75.627*** 
      
(16.976) (20.585) 
12 years 
     
34.580** 55.468*** 
      
(15.058) (19.381) 
13 years 
     
56.401*** 58.154*** 
      
(16.476) (19.060) 
14 years      58.519***  
      (22.397)  
15 years      39.881**  
      (18.112)  
16 years      -8.188  
      (15.044)  
17 years      74.473**  
      (33.531)  
18 years      61.745**  
      (25.785)  
19 years      102.363***  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size 
  
Above 90th 
percentile of size 
distribution 
Alternate Measure 
of FD: Deposits/ 
SDP 
Alternate Measure 
of FD: Branches/ 
1000 per 
Flexible 
States 
Inflexible 
States 
Firms born after 
de-licensing 
Firms born 
after 
Liberalization  
      (29.397)  
1 year x FD 
     
-7.333 -13.751 
      
(17.455) (21.238) 
2 years x FD 
     
-9.831 -14.822 
      
(17.405) (21.158) 
3 years x FD 
     
-16.507 -17.973 
      
(17.548) (21.242) 
4 years x FD 
     
-29.842* -31.605 
      
(17.561) (21.776) 
5 years x FD 
     
-21.415 -23.449 
      
(17.957) (22.005) 
6 years x FD 
     
-16.269 -6.011 
      
(17.765) (21.675) 
7 years x FD 
     
-7.698 8.038 
      
(18.130) (21.967) 
8 years x FD 
     
-26.276 -19.989 
      
(18.480) (22.742) 
9 years x FD 
     
-29.345 -24.090 
      
(18.730) (22.541) 
10 years x FD 
     
-21.840 -20.060 
      
(19.715) (22.728) 
11 years x FD 
     
-42.661* -32.858 
      
(22.311) (25.233) 
12 years x FD 
     
-3.930 1.660 
      
(21.283) (24.820) 
13 years x FD 
     
-26.654 1.197 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size Firm Size 
  
Above 90th 
percentile of size 
distribution 
Alternate Measure 
of FD: Deposits/ 
SDP 
Alternate Measure 
of FD: Branches/ 
1000 per 
Flexible 
States 
Inflexible 
States 
Firms born after 
de-licensing 
Firms born 
after 
Liberalization  
      
(22.208) (24.327) 
14 years x FD      -60.840**  
      (27.057)  
15 years x FD      -33.606  
      (24.493)  
16 years x FD      26.937  
      (27.568)  
17 years x FD      -69.032*  
      (39.521)  
18 years x FD      -42.525  
      (34.115)  
19 years x FD      -88.526**  
      (34.508)  
Log(SDP/Capita) 16.608* 6.812*** 11.195*** 6.795*** 22.466*** 13.529*** 7.594** 
 
(9.555) (1.841) (2.051) (2.092) (5.530) (2.897) (3.144) 
State Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Industry Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES YES NO YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 333.851*** -36.349** -70.096*** -43.029*** -152.354*** -63.601** -15.537 
 
(75.096) (14.216) (15.628) (16.237) (40.376) (30.189) (34.821) 
N 21114 201796 201796 140100 61696 41055 30844 
Adjusted R-square 0.137 0.105 0.105 0.103 0.127 0.007 0.077 
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively 
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Appendix A: ASI Sampling Design 
Year Census Sector Sample Sector  
(Definition borrowed verbatim from the Ministry of Statistics) 
1983-84 • All units with ≥ 50 workers and using 
power or ≥ 100 workers without using 
power 
• All electricity undertakings 
• All industrial units in 12 less industrially 
developed States/Union Territories* 
The rest of the universe was covered on sampling design adopting 
State x 3 digit industry group as stratum so as to cover all the units 
in a span of two consecutive years (50% samples in alternate years). 
1989-90 • All units with ≥ 100 workers with/without 
power 
• All electricity undertakings 
• All industrial units in 12 less industrially 
developed States/Union Territories* 
The rest of the universe was covered on sampling design adopting 
State X 3 digit industry group as stratum so as to cover all the units 
in a span of three years.  
In any stratum, if the number of units was less than 20, then the 
entire stratum was enumerated completely along with census 
factories. 
In any stratum if no. of unit is between 21 & 60, a minimum sample 
of size 20 was selected by Circular Systematic Sampling. For all 
other units a uniform sampling fraction of 1/3 was adopted. 
1994-95 • All units with ≥ 100 workers with/without 
power 
• All electricity undertakings 
• All industrial units in 12 less industrially 
developed States/Union Territories* 
The rest of the universe was covered on sampling design adopting 
State X 3 digit industry group as stratum so as to cover all the units 
in a span of three years.  
In any stratum, if the number of units was less than 20, then the 
entire stratum was enumerated completely along with census 
factories. 
In any stratum if no. of unit is between 21 & 60, a minimum sample 
of size 20 was selected by Circular Systematic Sampling. For all 
other units a uniform sampling fraction of 1/3 was adopted. 
1998-99 • All industrial units in 5 less industrially 
developed States/Union Territories ** 
• Units having ≥200 workers and all factories 
covered under Joint Returns 
After identifying Census sector factories, rest of the factories were 
arranged in ascending order of States, NIC-98 (4 digit), number of 
workers and district and properly numbered. The Sampling was 
taken within each stratum (State X Sector X 4-digit NIC) with a 
minimum of 8 samples in each stratum in the form of 2 sub-
samples. For the first time, all electricity undertakings other than 
captive units, Government Departmental undertakings such as 
Railway Workshops, P & T workshops etc. were kept out of 
coverage of ASI. 
2000-01 • All industrial units in 5 less industrially 
developed States/Union Territories ** 
• Units having ≥100 workers and all factories 
covered under Joint Returns 
After identifying Census sector factories, rest of the factories were 
arranged in ascending order of States, NIC-98 (4 digit), number of 
workers and district and properly numbered. The Sampling fraction 
was taken as 12% within each stratum (State X Sector X 4-digit 
NIC) with a minimum of 8 samples except for the State of Gujarat 
where 9.5% sampling fraction was used. For the States of Jammu & 
Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Daman & Diu, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, 
Goa and Pondicherry, a minimum of 4 samples per stratum was 
selected. For the States of Bihar and Jharkhand, a minimum of 6 
samples per stratum was selected. The entire sample was selected in 
the form of two independent sub-sample using Circular Systematic 
Sampling method. 
2004-05 • All industrial units in 6 less industrially 
developed States/Union Territories *** 
• Units having ≥100 workers and all factories 
covered under Joint Returns  
• All units belonging to the strata (State x 4-
digit of NIC-04) having less than or equal to 
4 units are also considered as Census Sector 
units. 
Remaining units are arranged in order of their number of workers 
and samples are then drawn circular systematically considering 
sampling fraction of 20% within each stratum (State x Sector x 4-
digit NIC) for all the states. An even number of units with a 
minimum of 4 are selected and evenly distributed in two sub-
samples. The sectors considered here are Biri, Manufacturing and 
Electricity. 
* Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Chandigarh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, Daman & Diu, Pondicherry Dadra & Nagar 
Haveli, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands 
** Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands. 
*** Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, Sikkim, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands. 
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Appendix B: Sample and Population Sizes in the ASI/NSS 
Survey Sample  Population 
 
ASI 1983/84 59000 95,133 
ASI 1989/90 49485 49,485 
ASI 1994/95 57933 117,290 
ASI 1999/00 33515 174,263 
ASI 2004/05 49340 164,265 
NSS 1994/95 
(Informal) 
120609 10,497,371 
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Appendix C: Concordance between US-SIC and ISIC-Revision 2 
ISIC Rev. 2 ISIC Industry Description SIC 
311-312 Food products 201,202,203,204,205,206, 207, 209 
313 Beverages 208 
314 Tobacco 21 
321 Textiles 22 
322 Wearing apparel, except footwear 23, 315 
323 Leather products 311,316,317,319 
324 Footwear, except rubber or plastic 313, 314 
331 Wood products, except furniture 24 
332 Furniture, except metal 25 except 2514  
341 Paper and products 26 
342 Printing and publishing 27 
351 Industrial chemicals 281,286,287,282 
352  Other chemicals 283,284,284, 285, 289 
353 Petroleum refineries 291 
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 295,299 
355 Rubber products 301,302,305,306 
356 Plastic products 308 
361 Pottery, china, earthenware 326 
362 Glass and products 321,322,323, 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 325,327,324,328,329 
371 Iron and steel 331,332 
372 Non-ferrous metals 333, 334, 335, 336 
381 Fabricated metal products 34, 2514 
382 Machinery, except electrical 35 
383 Machinery, electric 36 
384 Transport equipment 37 
385 Professional and scientific equipment 38 
390 Other manufactured products 39 
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Appendix D: Employment Categories in ASI 1994/95 and NSS 1994/95 Surveys 
Panel A: ASI Data 
Sl. 
No. Item 
Average number of 
persons worked 
1 Workers Employed 
directly 
Men  
2 Women  
3 Children  
4 Sub-total (1+2+3)   
5 Employed through contractors  
6 Total Workers (4+5)  
7 Supervisory & managerial staff  
8 Other employees  
9 Total (6 to 8)  
10 Working proprietors  
11 Unpaid family members  
12 If cooperative factory unpaid working members  
13 Total (9 to 12)  
 
Panel B: NSS Data 
Sl. 
No. Item 
Average number (modal value) 
of persons per working day 
during the reference month 
1 
Hired workers (other 
than household workers) 
Men  
2 Women  
3 Children Boys  4 Girls  
5 
H
ou
se
-h
ol
d 
w
or
ke
rs
 
 
Pa
id
 
 
Men  
6 Women  
7 
C
hi
ld
re
n 
Boys  
8 
Girls 
 
9 
U
np
ai
d 
 
Men  
10 Women  
11 
C
hi
ld
re
n 
Boys  
12 
Girls 
 
13 All workers  
14 Supervisory & 
managerial staff 
Men  
15 Women  
16 Other employees Men  
17 Women  
18 Working proprietors Men  
19 Women  
20 If co-operative society 
unpaid working 
members 
Men  
21 Women  
22 All employees (13 to 21)  
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